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Income-tax Department
Edited

by

Stephen G. Rusk

“Profit from the sale of municipal bonds is exempt from income tax, such
tax being either on the bonds themselves or on the income arising therefrom,”
is the language used by Judge Cant of the United States district court, district
of Minnesota, third division, in the case of Bunn v. Willcuts, collector.
This decision must be good news to a large body of taxpayers who have been
under the impression that only interest derived from the obligations of a state,
territory or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, is
exclusible from gross income for federal income-tax purposes. To the writer,
also, is it news, and he remembers with chagrin that he has advised his clients on
numerous occasions that whereas interest on such obligations need not be
included in gross income, any loss sustained or any profit earned on the sale or
other disposition of such securities was properly includible in the elements
comprising taxable income.
The judge’s opinion sounds reasonable enough when he states that a tax on a
profit from the sale is exempt from taxation, such tax being either on the bonds
or on the income derived therefrom, but if he is right, it seems a bit strange that
congress permitted the exclusion from gross income of only the interest on
such securities.
Furthermore, the question immediately arises as to whether or not those
financial houses the major part of whose income is derived from the purchase
and sale of state, county, municipal bonds, etc., should have paid income taxes
on the profits so earned.
A brief statement of the court’s opinion is ventured in the following para
graphs:
1. The means and instrumentalities of a state government are exempt from
taxation.
2. This principle is not based upon any constitutional provision. It rests
on necessary implication.
3. It also covers income arising from such obligations.
(Conclusion):
It is, therefore, beyond dispute that income from bonds such as those
here in question is not subject to a tax under the revenue law.
Further along, the court states it to be an underlying principle that the
government shall not exercise the power of taxation in such manner as in any
substantial degree to interfere with the state in any of its governmental func
tions.
The court is of the opinion that should the investing public know that any
gain or profit realized from a rise in value of such bonds would be subject to a
federal tax, this would operate to discourage the public from dealing in such
securities and would cause a reduction in the prices which persons would be
willing to pay therefor.
Even though one might prefer to believe with the court that a profit from the
sale of such securities should be exclusible from the gross income and, therefore,
not subject to a tax, the fact that there is a marked difference between income
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arising from the possession of such securities and that derived from buying and
selling such securities causes some doubts to linger in one’s mind. Further
more, it seems doubtful if the taxing of income derived from the sale of such
securities “in any substantial degree interferes with the state in its govern
mental functions.”
Final decision of this case will be awaited with much interest.
A belated decision with respect to invested capital reduction, under the
1918 act, by reason of a tentative tax computed on the income for that year in
determining the amount of current earnings available for payment of dividends,
was rendered by the United States circuit court of appeals for the third circuit.
This decision, if it had been rendered in any year between 1918 and 1924, would
have saved taxpayers in those years some taxes. The Pittsburgh Knife and
Forge Company, in whose case the decision was recently made, evidently did
not agree with the commissioner’s theory upon the subject, and was persistent
enough to contend through years of litigation for that which it deemed to be
proper.
Tax practitioners are familiar with the theory underlying this decision,
wherein it was held by the commissioner that unless current earnings of a
corporation were sufficient to cover a dividend paid during the year, invested
capital must be reduced by the amount by which the dividend exceeded current
earnings up to the date the dividend was paid. In arriving at current earnings,
the commissioner insisted that the income tax on current earnings should be
deemed to reduce the earnings available for dividend purposes. Most of the
tax practitioners argued at the time that the income tax was not a liability of
the current year, and, therefore, it should not be applied as a reduction of
corporate net earnings of the current year. At last, these practitioners are
justified, but to many of them there is little satisfaction in being proved correct
at this late date.

RECENT RULINGS
The beverage tax imposed upon a manufacturer of soft drinks which had
notified its customers that the price included the amount of tax imposed by
sec. 628 of the act of 1918, should be computed on the full price received where
he failed to bill the tax separately as required by the regulations. (Supreme
court of the U. S. Lash's Products Company v. United States.)
Profit derived in 1917 and 1918 by a lessor of mining properties is the fair
cash value on March 1, 1913, of the tonnage mined in such years, less the in
terest carrying charge of 5% from March 1, 1913, to the taxable years. (U. S.
circuit court of appeals, seventh circuit, Mabel G. Reinecke v. Collector.)
The date of allowance of a credit is the date when the commissioner signed
the “Schedule of overassessments and allowance of abatements, credits,” etc.,
for transmission to the collector containing his authorization to apply over
payments of tax as a credit against taxes due, if any, and, where such allowance
was made prior to the effective date of the 1926 act, the taxpayer is entitled to
interest upon overpayments for the fiscal year 1918 from the date of such over
payment until the date of an additional assessment for the fiscal year 1919,
against which such overpayment was credited, under sec. 1019 of the 1924 act.
(District court of the U. S., western district of Pennsylvania. Penn Smokeless
Coal Co. v. United States.)
Six corporations were held to be affiliated for 1920 where 71% of three cor
porations, 78% of a fourth and over 95% of a fifth were owned by the sixth
corporation or its organization, which controlled other stock through agree
ments that the stock of the minority stockholders was to be offered for sale to
the parent company first, and through proxies, and the companies were

223

The Journal of Accountancy
guided by a common interest and a common object obtained by pursuing the
same methods through the same agencies. (U. S. circuit court of appeals,
seventh circuit, The Great Lakes Hotel Co. v. Commissioner.)
Profit from the sale of municipal bonds is exempt from income tax, such
tax being either on the bonds themselves or on the income arising therefrom.
(U. S. district court, third division of Minnesota, Chas. Bunn v. Collector.)
Profit from the sale in United States of goods manufactured abroad by a
foreign corporation is gross income from sources within the United States
within the meaning of sec. 233(b), act of 1918. (U. S. circuit court of appeals,
second circuit, Tootal Broadhurst Lee Company, Ltd., v. Commissioner.)
Amount designated “bankers’ commissions” paid in 1918 was held to be the
purchase price of stock representing ownership in a fumigating plant and not a
deductible expenditure in the nature of interest. Such amount was paid under
an arrangement between the taxpayer and certain bankers by which the latter
agreed to furnish the funds for the construction of such plant in consideration
of the repayment of their advances plus a lump sum to be paid out of the
earnings of the plant, which arrangement was carried out by the organization of
a new corporation to which the bankers transferred the plant for stock plus cash
equal to the organization shares and an agreement to repay the amounts ex
pended for the plant, and the transfer of the stock of the new corporation to the
taxpayer for the lump sum which was paid out of dividends of the new corpora
tion. (District court of the U. S., district of Massachusetts, Wiggin Terminals,
Inc., v. United States.)
Appeal from an order of the supreme court of the District of Columbia
granting a temporary injunction restraining the collection of a tax barred by the
statute of limitations was dismissed as premature, without passing on the merits
of the case, such interlocutory injunction not being appealable, under the law,
since it did not affirmatively change nor affect the possession of property.
(Court of appeals, District of Columbia, Andrew W. Mellon, sec’y. of treasury,
v. Edward P. Mertz.)
Amount paid by a lessee out of royalties accruing after a specified date from
an undivided interest in an oil well under a compromise agreement between such
lessor and another claiming title to the land adversely to that of the lessor’s
grantor providing for the payment to the adverse claimant of a stated amount
out of the royalties to be received and the relinquishment by the party claiming
title to the land of his adverse claim to such lessor’s right to receive royalties,
is not part of the lessor’s gross income, since the ownership thereof vested in
another when they accrued. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, fifth circuit,
United States v. Frank J. and Mrs. Frank J. Looney.)
Sec. 611, act of 1928, is no defense to the collector in a personal action against
him for the recovery of 1918 taxes collected June 7, 1926, under duress after the
expiration of the statutory period on collection and when the liability therefor
had been extinguished where a claim for abatement had been filed and re
jected October 6, 1921, and the commissioner had thereafter granted special
assessment, such section not being a specific retroactive ratification of an
illegal collection by the collector as agent. (District court of the U. S., western
district of Pennsylvania, Clinton Iron & Steel Co. v. D. B. Heiner, collector.)
Dividends received in 1917 by the executors of an estate on stock specifically
bequeathed before such legacies were paid are income received by an estate
during administration taxable as an entity to the estate under sec. 2(b), act of
1916, as amended, at the 1917 rates. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, first
circuit, Clarence M. Woolley, et al., executors, v. John F. Malley, former collector.)
Income received by the executors of an estate in 1917 from the residuary
estate the income of which was to be distributed to certain beneficiaries, before
it had been transferred to trustees for beneficiaries as provided by the will, is
assessable to the executors as income received during the period of administra
tion of the estate, at the rates imposed upon executors as taxable persons under
sec. 8(c), act of 1916 as amended. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, first circuit,
John F. Malley, former collector, v. Clarence M. Woolley, et al.)
Section 615, act of 1928, amending sec. 177 of the Judicial Code, as amended,
is not retroactive, and interest on a judgment for the recovery of a tax rendered
by the supreme court in 1927 is allowable under sec. 1117, act of 1926, amending
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sec. 177 of the Judicial Code, to the date of entry of the final judgment. (U. S.
court of claims, The S. S. White Dental Mfg. Company of Pennsylvania v.
United States.}
Liability for breach of a contract as established by a judgment rendered in a
subsequent year is deductible in the year of the breach by a taxpayer on the
accrual basis who set up on its books a reserve for such liability in the year of
the breach, such liability being created by the breach of the contract, and not
by the admission of liability therefor to the creditor. (U. S. circuit court of
appeals, second circuit, American Code Company, Inc., v. Commissioner.}
Income received in 1919 and 1920 by a trust and added to the corpus pur
suant to a trust deed providing for distribution of the income thereof at the
discretion of the trustee or upon demand by the majority of the beneficiaries, no
demand for distribution having been made, is taxable to the trust as income held
for future distribution. (District court of the United States, western district
of Missouri, C. S. Jobes, trustee of C. S. Jobes Trust Estate, v. Noah Crooks,
collector.)
Contract held to be a licence for the use of a secret process and not a sale of
such process, and the payments received under it are income and not a realiza
tion of capital. (U. S. court of claims, Charles E. Kaltenbach v. United States.)
Invested capital for 1918 should not be reduced on account of a tentative tax
computed upon income for that year in determining the amount of current
earnings available for the payment of dividends. (U. S. circuit court of ap
peals, third circuit, Commissioner of internal revenue v. Pittsburgh Knife &
Forge Co.)
Payments to cover expenses and losses incident to the sudden cessation of
work on government contracts and return to the regular line of manufacture
received under supplemental agreements canceling war contract should be
offset by expenditures necessary to effect resumption of peace-time activities.
The taxpayer’s proof as to such expenses and losses, which could not be
segregated on its books, consisting of the uncontradicted testimony of its vicepresident in charge of the negotiation with the government and the reconstruc
tion of the plant, stricken out in the hearing before the board of tax appeals on
the ground that the books were the best evidence, and was held to be adequate.
The board erred in holding in B. T. A. Dec. 2776, 7 B. T. A. 1277, noted at Par..
3311.06a, Vol. II, that any part of the payments received under the supple
mental agreements should be subject to the higher rates of sec. 301(c), act of
1918, and the decision was reversed and remanded. (U. S. circuit court of
appeals, second circuit, R. Hoe & Co., Inc., v. Commissioner.}
Contributions in 1921 to the Y. M. C. A., the Y. W. C. A. and to a hospital
are not deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses by a corpora
tion. (U. S. court of claims, Alfred J. Sweet, Inc., v. United States.}
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